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Abstract 
This paper provides an empirical analysis of the role of financial 
development and financial integration in the growth dynamics of transition 
countries. We focus on the role of financial integration in determining the 
impact of financial development on growth, distinguishing “normal times” 
from periods of financial crises. In addition to confirming the significant 
positive effect on growth exerted by financial development and financial 
integration, our estimates show that a higher degree of financial openness 
tends to reduce the contractionary effect of financial crises, by cushioning the 
effect on the domestic supply of credit. Consequently, the high reliance on 
international capital flows by transition countries does not necessarily 
increase their financial fragility. This implies that financial protectionism is a 
self-defeating policy, at least for transition countries. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
In contrast with initial optimistic expectations, transition economies experienced significant and 
prolonged output declines after the start of transition. The magnitude of these declines was such 
that, at the end of the first decade of transition, only a few countries had a GDP per capita above 
their 1989 levels (Campos and Coricelli, 2002), which induced divergence from the incomes of 
developed countries. Indeed, relative to the EU income levels, incomes per capita of Central-
Eastern European countries (CEECs) in 2002 were lower than in 1989 (Coricelli et al., 2008).  
Following the Russian financial crisis in 1998 that adversely affected the whole region, transition 
countries experienced a more prosperous decade. The long-expected catching up with respect to the 
developed Western Europe was set in motion at significant speed (WEO, 2009). Both the 
development of national financial systems and international financial integration were likely two 
main ingredients of such a process.  
For financial development, the empirical analysis in Coricelli et al. (2008), using industry-level 
data for EU and transition countries, revealed that it indeed significantly contributed to growth and 
catching-up in transition economies. Similarly, financial integration seemed to play a comparably 
important role in the growth performance of transition economies. Transition countries participated 
fully in the increased volume of international financial flows,although, as documented in Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti (2007), transition countries differed sharply from other emerging countries. 
Significant capital inflows to transition countries resulted in persistent current account deficits 
associated with a sizable increase in private investment, well above domestic private savings. The 
most important component of capital inflows was foreign direct investment, which in 2004 for the 
region as a whole accounted for almost half of total external liabilities (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 
2007). Furthermore, there was a significant process of financial integration through cross-border 
bank acquisitions and lending, led by large Western European banking groups. An estimate by the 
IMF shows that European Banks’ claims in Emerging Europe peaked at almost 60% of destination 
countries’ GDP in 2007 (WEO April 2009). The empirical evidence also suggests that these 
developments significantly contributed to growth and income convergence of transition countries 
(Brezigar-Masten et al., 2008). 
Persistent current account deficits, however, raise the issue of sustainability of the negative foreign 
asset positions. Until recently, the outlook in this respect seemed quite favorable. Estimates by 
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) revealed a need of substantial future current account adjustments 
only for the Baltic countries, Bulgaria and Romania.  Among the factors contributing to this rather 
favorable assessment, they outlined strong export growth, low spreads on external debt, large EU 
transfers and large labor remittances. However, the worst financial and economic crisis since 
WWII that spread throughout the global economy at the end of 2008 calls for a reassessment of 
these issues. 
Heavy reliance on inflows of foreign capital (similarly to the developed world, these flows also 
significantly contributed to asset price and real estate bubbles in transition countries) implies that 
the global credit crunch had a much more severe effect on transition economies than on other 
emerging countries, which on average had positive current account positions in the period prior to 
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the crisis. Not surprisingly, transition countries are disproportionally represented in the list of 
recipients of financial assistance by the IMF. 
Especially when comparing transition countries with Asian and Latin American countries, the 
question arises whether reliance on international financial flows may have been excessive, and 
consequently whether most of the benefits of previous financial integration are at risk of being 
wiped out by the international financial turmoil of 2008. For instance, in their analysis of the effect 
of crises on economic growth, Cerra in Saxena (2007) show that in more financially open countries 
crises produce higher and persistent output losses. Edwards (2006) reaches similar conclusions. 
While he finds no conclusive evidence that higher capital mobility increases the incidence of crisis, 
his results suggest that that once a crisis occurs, countries with higher capital mobility may face 
higher reductions in output growth. The issue of a high degree of dependence on foreign sources of 
financing and potentially amplified effects of financial distress thus challenges the policymakers in 
transition countries and the rest of Europe (given the exposure of western financial institutions) to 
rethink the appropriateness of past policies and design necessary measures for the future.  
This paper provides a novel contribution to the literature field, by analyzing the impact of financial 
integration on domestic financial development during periods of crises, focusing on European 
countries. We concentrate directly on the financial integration-financial development nexus for two 
reasons. Firstly, it has been shown that financial integration affects growth mainly indirectly, 
through the effect of financial integration on domestic financial development (Kose et al., 2009). 
Secondly, the key issue is to determine whether high reliance on foreign funds magnifies the 
impact of a crisis on the domestic financial sector. Such magnified effects can have adverse effects 
on the real economy. 
This empirical analysis proceeds in two steps. In the first step, we provide evidence of a positive 
direct effect of financial development and financial integration on growth. This positive effect 
appears to be non-uniform across countries (and time) with a generally larger impact on transition 
economies, which leads to the conclusion that the increasing supply of finance and financial 
integration indeed fueled the income convergence observed in the last decade.  
However, financial development and financial integration are not independent processes: they 
move in parallel with one possibly being a catalyst for the other or even acting as a substitute.1 The 
mechanics behind their co-movement are likely to be complex, with different channels operating 
                                                          
 
 
 
1 If the domestic financial sector is unable to meet a higher demand for finance, cross-border borrowing may serve as a 
substitute in the case of sufficient degree of institutional homogeneity between donor and recipient countries. Conversely, 
increased competition from foreign financial institutions and/or their entry to the market may stimulate the development 
of domestic financial institutions. The latter group also benefits from access to foreign sources of funds. 
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during periods of output expansions and periods of crises. This is why in the second step we use the 
data on financial crises dates from Cerra and Saxena (2007) and show that the overall supply of 
finance significantly decreases in crises, which suppresses growth or deepens the recession in 
addition to other direct effects of the crisis. A higher degree of financial openness, however, does 
not seem to aggravate the effects of a crisis. On the contrary, financially more open countries 
experience a smaller decline in the supply of finance and thus a smaller amplification of the 
business cycle through the channel between financial development and growth. In other words, 
financial integration offers a steadier provision of finance through domestic financial markets also 
in crisis times.  
Calvo et al. (2008) found a similar result in connection with the probability of a sudden stop in 
capital flows, although they find the relationship to be non-linear. In a large cross-country analysis, 
they find that passed a given threshold, higher financial integration reduces the probability of a 
sudden stop. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the role of finance and financial 
integration in economic growth in transition countries. We present the basic stylized empirical facts 
underlying the process and provide estimates of the direct effect of financial development and 
financial integration on growth. Section 3 commences with the identification of the indirect effect 
of financial integration on growth through the effect on the development of national financial 
markets. In addition, the section evaluates how episodes of financial crises interfere with this 
indirect effect. This enables us to evaluate whether financially more open countries suffer from 
higher financial disruptions in times of crises. Section 4 concludes with a discussion of policy 
implications. 
 
2 TWO DECADES OF TRANSITION – THE ROLE OF FINANCE AND FINANCIAL 
INTEGRATION 
Transition countries suffered from severe initial output collapses. The magnitude of negative 
growth rates at the beginning of transition (see left panel of Figure 1) was indeed remarkable. 
Furthermore, during the 1991-1997 period output grew on average only in Hungary, Poland and 
Slovenia (Campos and Coricelli, 2002). Output losses were particularly severe in the CIS, for 
which output decline continued until 1997, resulting in a cumulative loss of output of almost 50%.  
Convergence towards developed countries in Central and Eastern Europe started in 1994 and 
accelerated after 2000. However, because of the initial collapse, the right panel of Figure 1 reveals 
that CEE countries as a whole started to fill the gap with developed countries only in 2003. As 
whole, CEE countries fared better than Latin America during this period, and were also catching up 
with the pace of convergence of Emerging Asia. 
By contrast, the picture of convergence for the CIS has been dismal. The size of the initial slump 
was such that it took them more than 15 years for real incomes to recover their pre-transition 
levels. This essentially implies that after two decades of transition the CIS diverged rather than 
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converged. The outlook from the present crisis reveals additional risks for their convergence, as 
soaring commodity prices were the main cause of the growth in the CIS after 1999. 
Figure 1: GDP per capita growth and income convergence across world regions  
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Source: World Development Indicators 
  
 
Financial markets played a crucial role in determining the output dynamics in transition countries, 
both during the phase of the initial collapse and during the subsequent recovery. Calvo and 
Coricelli (1992, 1993) argued that the initial collapse in output could be interpreted as a trade 
implosion due to the sudden drying-up of financing for firms induced by the initial liberalization 
and stabilization programs. This is also confirmed by looking at aggregate data on the GDP shares 
of domestic credit to private sector. In the upper-left panel of Figure 2, we can observe that credit 
indeed contracted in the initial years of transition both in Central and Eastern European countries 
and the CIS group. In the same period, the rest of the world expanded credit.  
Subsequently, financial markets in transition countries went through a process of considerable 
deepening, starting from an initial position of extreme shallowness. This is especially evident for 
the case of the previously non-existent stock market. Compared to other regions, stock markets 
remain shallow, with practically no signs of convergence towards shares in GDP observed in 
developed world and Emerging Asia. A similar observation applies to the depth of credit market in 
the CIS. In CEE, the process of deepening accelerated to some extent after 2002, and outpaced the 
levels observed in Latin America. As seen from bottom-right panel of Figure 2, this was mainly 
because Latin America never joined the significant financial expansion that was common to the 
rest of the world.  
In this respect, we can say that the increased pace of financial deepening in transition countries 
belonged to a common trend, while in relative terms their financial markets remain shallow when 
compared to developed world. Nevertheless, we show below that transition countries benefited 
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2010.21
  
 
 
6 
 
more from the process and that financial development may have been a very important factor in 
income convergence. 
Figure 2: Financial deepening by world regions, 1991-2006 
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Source: World Development Indicators 
 
Similar observations apply to measures of financial integration. The upper-left panel of Figure 3 
plots the share of total foreign assets and liabilities in the GDP. Starting from low levels, transition 
countries caught up with Latin America, but remained far less financially integrated than Emerging 
Asia and the developed world. From the upper-right panel of Figure 3, we can also observe that the 
latter group of countries shows a faster process of integration throughout the period, again leading 
to the conclusion that no relative convergence in the levels of financial integration occurred in 
transition countries. The same observations also hold when looking only at the shares of total 
foreign liabilities in bottom-left panel of Figure 3. 
The bottom-right panel of Figure 3 reveals some details of the net international capital flows that 
accompanied the growth process in different regions of the world. The relative stability of the net 
foreign asset position of developed countries suggests that a large expansion of financial 
integration came through a balanced increase in both inflows and outflows.2 At the upper extreme 
                                                          
 
 
 
2 Naturally, averaging may hide some stark differences among countries within the group. 
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lies Emerging Asia. From the negative net asset position, they went into a surplus, which clearly 
demonstrates that they coupled their fast growth (see Figure 1) with domestic saving growing faster 
than investments. 
Figure 3: Dynamics of financial integration, 1991-2004. 
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Source: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006) 
Transition countries reveal a rather different pattern. They comply with the standard theoretical 
view that capital flows into faster growing countries. They accumulated significant negative net 
asset positions, comparable to the highly indebted Latin American countries.3 The fact that 
transition countries have been the fastest growing region in the world, after the initial transition 
depression, suggests that financial development and financial integration may have crucially 
contributed to it. The next section presents an econometric assessment of this conjecture. 
 
                                                          
 
 
 
3 A significant improvement after 1999 can be observed for the CIS. This is related to rising commodity prices in world 
markets. 
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3 THE ROLE OF FINANCIAL INTEGRATION AND FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT 
DURING CRISES  
The bulk of the literature on financial integration and financial crises analyzes whether financial 
openness acts as a catalyst of financial crises (see the literature review in Kose et al., 2009). In this 
respect, many authors do not find that higher financial integration increases the incidence of 
financial crises, regardless of whether financial openness is measured through capital mobility 
(Edwards, 2006) or stocks of foreign assets and liabilities (Bonfiglioli, 2008). The focus of our 
analysis is different. In the light of 2008’s global financial turmoil, we think it is more appropriate 
to analyze how financial openness affects macroeconomic dynamics after the crisis has occurred. 
Loosely speaking, our interest is not in the causes of the financial crises, but in the causal effects of 
the financial crises, and how these causal effects interact with financial integration.4 The literature 
on this latter point is much scarcer. Some evidence can be found in Edwards (2006), who reports 
that countries with higher capital mobility may face higher reductions in output growth once a 
crisis occurs.  
Although similar in its basic objective, this analysis still differs from the analysis of Edwards 
(2006) in one important  aspect. Financial integration is usually a process that is only a part of a 
wider process of economic integration that most importantly also includes trade integration. In this 
respect, the analysis of the role of financial integration in times of financial crisis needs to avoid 
confounding the effects of the financial crisis on output that are due to general levels of 
international economic integration, such as openness to trade, given that a financial crisis may also 
be accompanied by reductions in export demand. For this reason, we concentrate on the effects of 
financial integration through the finance channel and evaluate the effects of financial integration in 
times of crises through the finance and growth relation. In this way, we isolate the effects financial 
integration may have on growth through amplification or compression of credit crunches caused by 
the crises.  
The empirical analysis proceeds in two stages. The first stage, presented in Section 3.1, consists of 
evaluating the effect of finance on the growth of GDP. Even though we are mainly interested in 
estimating the effect of financial development on growth, we also acknowledge that financial 
integration may have a direct effect on growth. In the second step, presented in Section 3.2, we 
model the depth of financial markets conditional on the level of financial integration (and other 
controlling variables). With this we want to evaluate whether financial integration stimulates the 
development of national financial markets or not, and whether there also exists an indirect channel, 
                                                          
 
 
 
4
 Given that not all financial crises events can be treated as exogenous, we treat them as endogenous in our empirical 
application. 
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through which financial integration affects growth. However, financial openness may also increase 
exposure to financial shocks. For this reason, we also control in the second stage for the effects of 
crises on financial development by including dummy variables corresponding to the dates of 
financial crises given in Cerra and Saxena (2007). Our prior is that financial crises lead to 
contractions in credit supply, and in this way adversely affect output through the finance and 
growth relation. To test whether financial openness aggravates or ameliorates the problem, we 
interact crises dummies with a measure of financial openness. The coefficient pertaining to this 
interaction term then measures whether a higher degree of financial openness amplifies or cushions 
the contractionary effect of crises on the supply of credit. At the same time, this also identifies the 
effect of financial integration on output in times of crises through the finance channel. 
3.1 The non-linear growth effects of financial development and financial integration in 
Europe 
The empirical approach used in this section is an extension of the analysis in Brezigar-Masten et al. 
(2008), who analyze threshold effects in the relationship between financial integration, financial 
development and growth. Given that the focus of the analysis are transition countries, whose 
profile of international financial linkages is tightly linked to the EU, our selection of country 
sample concentrates on Europe. In this way, we use aggregate-level annual data for 31 European 
countries (EU27, Croatia, Ukraine, Russian Federation, Iceland and Norway) for the 1996-2004 
period5, and we estimate the following dynamic panel equation: 
GDPgrowth it = ρGDPgrowth i,t−1 + βFDit +γFI it + µpi it +α i +δt + uit , (1) 
where the dependent variable equals real GDP per capita growth in country i and period t. In order 
to capture the persistence of GDP growth, we specify the growth equation dynamically and include 
lagged GDP per capita growth on the right side of the equation. 
FD is a measure of the depth of national financial markets, which we use as a proxy for financial 
market development. Following Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Guiso et al. (2004), among others, 
we use a wide measure of financial depth: market capitalization and domestic credit provided by 
the banking sector as share of GDP. The corresponding coefficient β is the key parameter of 
interest in this part of the analysis. 
                                                          
 
 
 
5 The dataset ends in 2004 because this is the final year for which the data on measures of financial integration are 
available. 
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FI measures international financial integration. In principle, there are three main sets of measures 
of financial integration: price-based, news-based and size-based measures (Beale et al., 2004). For 
the purposes of our analysis, it is important to use a measure that exhibits sufficient time variation. 
In this respect, we prefer to a use size-based measure, because its construction can be based on 
more objective statistical grounds. In addition, we follow Prasad et al. (2003) in using stock rather 
than flow size-based measures. Stocks are less volatile between years and are less prone to 
measurement error (assuming that such errors are not correlated over time) than measures based on 
capital flows. Moreover, they are closer to the theoretical concept of financial openness that 
emphasizes both the ability of foreigners to invest into and lend to a country, and domestic agents 
to borrow from and invest abroad. In this application, we measure financial integration with the 
sum of stock of total foreign assets and liabilities as a percentage of GDP. Brezigar-Masten et al. 
(2008), show that these types of estimations are also very robust to other, more disaggregate, 
measures of financial integration (FDI, portfolio, etc.). 
The empirical model also contains inflation as a proxy for macroeconomic stability. In addition, we 
considered the public balance, which generally resulted as insignificant, and estimates are thus not 
reported here.6  
αi are fixed effects that allow us to control for time-invariant determinants of growth such as 
human capital (the literature usually proxies this with measures of educational attainment, but 
given the short time period under analysis we assume it is fixed), institutional factors (protection of 
property rights, administrative barriers, etc.) and other time-invariant unobservable factors that may 
otherwise bias the coefficients. δt are common time effects that capture the business-cycle effects 
that may otherwise cause spurious correlations between growth and explanatory variables.  
The source of data, including size-based measures of financial development, is the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators database. The source of stock size-based measures of financial 
integration is the dataset constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006).  
Given the dynamic specification of the panel equation (1), the proper estimator is the Arellano and 
Bond (1991) GMM estimator. It is also very convenient that the GMM procedure at the same time 
allows us to control for endogeneity bias induced by reverse causality running from GDP growth to 
financial integration, the development of national financial markets and other explanatory 
variables. 
                                                          
 
 
 
6 Results available upon request. 
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We focus on the results of the one-step estimator, because simulation studies (Arellano and Bond 
(1991), Blundell and Bond (1998), Bond and Windmeijer (2000)) show very modest efficiency 
gains from the two-step estimator, even in the presence of considerable heteroskedasticity. 
Furthermore, the dependence of the two-step weight matrix on estimated parameters makes the 
usual asymptotic distribution approximations less reliable for the two-step estimator. Simulation 
studies showed that the asymptotic standard errors tend to be much too small or the asymptotic t-
ratios much too big for the two-step estimator, in the sample sizes where the equivalent tests based 
on the one-step estimator are quite accurate. 
The consistency of the GMM estimator depends on the validity of its instrument set. To address 
this issue, we consider two specification tests suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano 
and Bover (1995), and Blundell and Bond (1997). The first is the Sargan test of over-identifying 
restrictions, which tests the overall validity of instruments by analyzing the sample analog of 
moment conditions used in the estimation process. Since the Sargan test over-rejects in the 
presence of heteroscedasticity, we use its two-step version. The second test examines the 
hypothesis that the error terms are not serially correlated. In the difference regression, we test 
whether the differenced error term is second-order serially uncorrelated (by construction, the 
differenced error term is first-order serially correlated even if the original error term is not). 
The results of estimation of model (1) are given in Table 1. As mentioned earlier, our main interest 
lies in parameter β, the coefficient of the financial development variable, FD. In the baseline 
specification in column (1), the coefficient is significantly positive. Thus, a higher supply of 
finance stimulates growth both in the short and long run. In column (2) we add a measure of 
financial integration to the model. The variable FI is insignificant, while the coefficient of financial 
development remains significantly positive. In our previous work (see Brezigar-Masten et al., 
2008) we argued that financial integration affects growth in a non-linear manner. Here, we capture 
this non-linearity in two ways. The first is by allowing the coefficient of FI to differ between 
transition countries (FI_transition) and developed European economies (FD_eu).  
Returning our attention to estimates of the parameter β, we see that controlling for threshold effects 
in financial integration reinforces the estimated effect of financial development on growth. For this 
reason, we consider one additional modification of the model by splitting the effect of financial 
development between transition and developed European countries (see column 5). As it turns out, 
both coefficients are significantly positive, but the stimulus that financial development of financial 
markets gives to growth in transition economies exceeds the one in developed Europe by a factor 
of 4.  
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Table 1: The effect of financial development and financial integration on growth in Europe, 1995-2004 
(dependent variable: GDP per capita growth)  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
GDPgrowtht-1 0.455*** 0.423*** 0.383*** 0.420*** 0.419*** 
  (0.091) (0.087) (0.073) (0.075) (0.071) 
FD 0.032** 0.023** 0.013* 0.022**  
  (0.015) (0.011)  (0.007) (0.009)  
FD_transition     0.063*** 
      (0.022) 
FD_eu     0.014* 
      (0.008) 
FI  -0.000    
   (0.001)    
FI_transition   0.051***   
    (0.012)   
       
FI_eu   0.0009   
     (0.046)   
FI (FD < 90 %     0.022*** 0.019*** 
of GDP)    (0.006) (0.005) 
FI (FD 90 -    0.008*** 0.007*** 
 150% of GDP)    (0.003) (0.003) 
FI (FD > 150%    0.0001 0.0002 
of GDP)    (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Inflation -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.010*** -0.011** 
  (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
# obs. 212 212 212 212 212 
N 31 31 31 31 31 
m1 0.008 0.011 0.009 0.016 0.008 
m2 0.147 0.213 0.136  0.529 0.196 
Notes: First step GMM results. All regressions include common time effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical 
significance at 1, 5 and 10%, respectively. Four lags of all variables used as instruments in the GMM procedure. Sargan test of over-identifying 
restrictions (obtained from second-step results) in all cases indicate the validity of instrument set (available upon request). m1 and m2 are p-values of 
tests for first and second order autocorrelation in differenced residuals. Constant not reported. The measure of financial integration (FI) is sum of total 
assets and liabilities, end-of-period stocks, expressed as a percentage of GDP. The measure of financial development (FD) is the sum of stock market 
capitalization and domestic credit in percentage of GDP.  
3.2 Financial development and financial integration during crises 
The previous subsection provides evidence of a positive direct effect of financial development and 
financial integration on growth, which leads to the conclusion that the increasing supply of finance 
and financial integration indeed fuelled income convergence observed in the previous decade. 
Financial development and financial integration, however, are not independent processes; on the 
contrary, they can run in parallel or even act as substitutes. Financial integration can bring similar 
benefits to those associated with financial deepening; for example, international financial markets 
may channel funds to profitable investment activities, and portfolio diversification in the world 
may smooth consumption of households allowing the economy to improve profitability of 
investment. This raises important policy issues. Firstly, it is important to know whether the 
deepening of domestic financial markets in transition countries can be fostered by international 
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financial integration. Secondly, transition countries opened their capital accounts whereby 
domestic financial markets became not only more competitive, but also more integrated with the 
rest of the world. In this respect, a natural question arises whether the absorptive capacity of 
financial markets of transition economies is sufficient to support the pre-crisis levels of financial 
integration. For all these reasons, the analysis of the indirect channel through which financial 
integration affect growth in transition economies lies at the centre of our analysis. In other words, 
in the second stage of analysis, we proceed to examine whether the increase in financial openness 
contributes to financial development and thereby stimulates growth through the relation confirmed 
at the first stage. More importantly, within this framework, we can also test how financial 
integration interacts with financial development in financial crises.  
 
Figure 4: Collapse of global export demand (growth of world merchandise trade) 
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Source: World Economic Outlook, April 2009. 
Financial crises happen for a number of complex reasons, while international financial flows and 
cross-border ownership of assets provide a channel for their transmission to other countries. In the 
evaluation of financial openness during periods of crisis, we need to avoid confounding it with 
other shocks observed during a crisis. As an illustration, consider the example of the collapse of 
sub-prime mortgage market in the US in 2007, which through a snowball effect grew in 2008 into 
the largest financial and economic crisis since WWII. Collapse in asset prices and bad loans led the 
banks to tighten credit. The same causes resulted in a sharp contraction of consumer spending. 
Both factors together cumulated in an economic slump. Cross-border ownership of toxic US assets 
created trouble for banks in the rest of the world, extending the credit crunch, with similar 
consequences, to other parts of the world. Financial integration thus provided a channel of financial 
contagion. However, the US crisis also affected the rest of the world through trade flows, which 
may have had a bigger impact on business confidence in manufacturing than financial contagion 
itself. Figure 4 clearly demonstrates how global trade virtually collapsed at the end of 2008. In our 
analysis of the effect of financial integration in crises, we want to abstract from the transmission of 
crises through trade and sharp swings of consumer and business sentiment. Our aim is to 
disentangle the effects of financial integration in crises on the national supply of finance as we 
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argue that this is the most important channel through which financial integration potentially 
amplifies the business cycle in case of adverse shocks. 
The empirical analysis of this section estimates the following dynamic panel equation: 
FDit = ρFDi,t−1 + λFI it + Dcrisis it +ϕFI it × Dcrisis it +γ ' Xit +α i +δt + v it
 , (2) 
where, as above, FD denotes the development of national financial markets measured as the share 
of market capitalization and domestic credit provided by banking sector in GDP (totfin), and FI is a 
measure of international financial integration. As above, we use the stock of total foreign assets and 
liabilities as a percentage of GDP (tfinint); however, as a robustness check we also report results 
using the stock of total foreign assets and liabilities without foreign direct investments (tped). The 
vector of control variables X contains GDP per capita and captures the demand-for-finance effect. 
As additional control variables, openness (measured as exports in percentage of GDP), and 
inflation were also considered, but the results were insignificant. The term iα
 
controls for all time-
invariant institutional factors that determine the level of financial development. Dcrisis is a dummy 
variable that takes on value 1 if country i suffers from a financial crisis, either banking crisis or a 
currency crisis, in period t. The data on dates of financial crises are taken from the database of 
Cerra and Saxena (2007), which covers the 1970-2001 period. The empirical analysis of the 
previous section considered the 1996-2004 sample. The starting date was determined by the 
availability of data for a wider set of transition economies, while the ending date by the time 
coverage of financial integration of Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006). Combining this dataset with 
the data on financial crises that ended in 2001 would entail a significant loss of observations. For 
this reason, the empirical analysis of this section extends the coverage of countries in the sample 
outside Europe to also include Latin America, Asia and Africa (see appendix for details and 
descriptive statistic of data). Altogether, the sample contains 64 countries with annual data for 
1988-2001; the sources of data are the same as above. Common with previous section are also the 
reasons to estimate model (2) with the GMM procedure developed by Arellano and Bond (1991). 
The results are presented in Table 2. 
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 2 present the estimates of the baseline model without interaction 
terms FI×Dcrisis. They show that higher financial integration significantly increases the depth of 
national financial markets and thus contributes to a higher supply of finance through domestic 
financial intermediaries. This confirms that in addition to the direct effect of financial integration 
on growth estimated in Table 1, there also exists the indirect positive effect of financial integration 
that operates through the development of domestic financial markets. 
Columns (3) to (6) contain estimation results for models that incorporate information on financial 
crises. In columns (3) and (4) only a financial crisis dummy is included, without its interaction with 
the measures of financial integration. Point estimates of the corresponding coefficient comply with 
expectations that financial crises reduce the supply of finance. The coefficient, however, is 
insignificant. When the crisis dummy is interacted with, measures of financial integration results 
improve. The “credit crunch” effect of financial crises becomes statistically significant, while the 
interaction term with financial integration is significantly positive. These results demonstrate that a 
financial crisis in itself reduces the supply of finance and thereby negatively affects output. 
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However, this negative effect on growth is smaller in financially more open countries. Larger 
access to foreign financial markets thus reduces the contractionary effects of crises. These results 
therefore reject the view that financial markets in financially more integrated countries suffer more 
from the credit crunch effects in crises. 
Table 2: Effect of financial integration on financial development during crises 
  
tfinint tped tfinint tped tfinint tped 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
0.333*** 0.328*** 0.354*** 0.350*** 0.363*** 0.358*** FDt-1 (0.095) (0.094) (0.099) (0.098) (0.096) (0.094) 
0.112* 0.138* 0.148** 0.174** 0.166*** 0.198*** 
FIt (0.064) (0.081) (0.067) (0.0867) (0.062) (0.074) 
  
  -5.897 -5.612 -11.527** -11.60*** 
Dcrisist 
  
  (4.506) (4.570) (4.899) (4.790) 
  
      0.037** 0.048** 
FIxDcrisist 
  
      (0.019) (0.022) 
0.009** -0.0003 0.007** 0.007** 0.006* 0.006* 
GDPpct (0.004) (0.0002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
# obs 565 565 565 565 565 565 
N 64 64 64 64 64 64 
m1 0.035 0.039 0.030 0.032 0.033 0.034 
m2 0.268 0.267 0.292 0.293 0.264 0.266 
Notes: First step GMM results. All regressions include common time effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical 
significance at 1, 5 and 10% respectively. Four lags of all variables used as instruments in the GMM procedure. Sargan test of over-identifying 
restrictions (obtained from second-step results) in all cases indicate the validity of instrument set (available upon request). m1 and m2 are p-values of 
tests for first and second order autocorrelation in differenced residuals. Constant not reported. 
Key: tfinint - sum of total assets and liabilities, tped - sum of portfolio equity and other debt instruments inflow and outflow. All variables are end-of-
period stocks, expressed as a percentage of GDP. The measures of financial development (FD) is the sum of stock market capitalization and domestic 
credit in percentage of GDP. Dcrisis is a dummy variable for the episodes of banking and currency crisis. GDPpc is GDP per capita in 2000 US$. 
  
4 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
While distress in financial markets may have been one of the key determinants of output collapses 
at the onset of transition, this paper also shows that the process of financial development and 
integration into international capital markets contributed positively to subsequent growth in 
transition economies.  
In this process, many transition economies accumulated considerable levels of negative net foreign 
asset positions. If it was previously thought that high export growth and low spreads on sovereign 
and corporate debt make such a situation sustainable and with only modest current account 
adjustments required in the future, the severity and expected longevity of the financial crisis of 
2008 significantly overturns the economic outlook in the region. In such circumstances, a natural 
question arises: whether policymakers should rethink or even change the supportive policy stance 
towards financial integration.  
In this respect, our estimates show that a higher degree of financial openness does not aggravate the 
effects of financial crises. Quite the opposite, financially more open countries experience a smaller 
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decline in the supply of finance and thus a smaller amplification of the business cycle through the 
finance-growth nexus. In other words, financial integration stimulates a steadier provision of 
finance through domestic financial markets also in crisis times. 
These findings lead to important implications for the future policy of financial integration. Our 
results show that responding to financial crises through financial protectionism is bound to be 
counter-productive. Such policies may insulate domestic financial institutions from international 
financial shocks, but they also deprive them of sufficient sources of finance and risk-hedging 
opportunities. To pay the price, the domestic economy faces higher financial constraints. 
Protectionist measures of many countries are thus bound to results in a bad global equilibrium and 
prolong the effects of the crisis. Intense efforts of developed countries and international financial 
institutions to stabilize international flows of capital represent a correct policy response. Transition 
countries, as the region that has suffered the most from this in the present crisis, would benefit from 
such policies the most.  
Politicians find it particularly difficult not to endorse short-sighted and populist measures. 
Financial openness makes countries more exposed to international financial turmoil. In addition, 
financial markets react swiftly – very often also in speculative manner – to domestic economic 
imbalances. The process of financial integration is in such cases easily held responsible for the 
crises and serves as scapegoat for short-sighted protectionist measures that very often do not 
acknowledge policy mistakes from the past, and hinder the need for structural reform. In such 
circumstances, ideas of protectionist measures quickly move to the top of the political agenda.  
The crisis of 2008 has also hit the developed countries very hard. The fiscal cost of rescue 
packages of financial institution and the worst recession since WWII will be huge. In spite of 
compelling evidence that protectionist policies are self-defeating, this makes the prospects for the 
future financial integration of transition countries uncertain. However, it is precisely the first two 
decades of transition that offer good lessons in support of further financial integration. The most 
successful transition economies are the ones that joined the process of EU integration and 
subsequently became members of the European Union. More importantly, even within this group 
we can observe that those countries that adopted the euro are better off in the current crisis.  
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DATA APPENDIX 
 
Table A1: Descriptive statistics of data used in Section 3.2 
Financial development Financial integration 
  
  
time span 
GDPpc 
growth Total 
finance 
Market 
capit. 
Private 
credit 
tfinint tped fdi tl 
Argentina 1988 2001 0.9 41.7 20.5 21.3 83.8 67.1 16.7 14.6 
Armenia 2001 2001 10.2 7.7 0.1 7.6 103.5 76.1 27.4 27.3 
Australia 1988 2001 2.0 133.5 66.6 66.9 117.5 76.5 41.0 25.7 
Bangladesh 1988 2001 2.4 22.4 2.7 19.6 44.6 42.4 2.2 2.1 
Belgium 1988 1997 2.1 97.2 38.2 59.0 392.5 329.1 63.4 37.5 
Bolivia 1994 2001 1.3 64.0 7.8 56.2 125.4 86.2 39.3 39.0 
Brazil 1992 2001 1.0 81.9 27.0 54.9 60.6 42.8 17.8 11.6 
Bulgaria 1995 2001 1.5 26.4 3.2 23.2 144.8 131.6 13.3 12.7 
Canada 1988 2001 1.6 171.2 71.2 100.1 162.8 119.5 43.3 21.9 
Chile 1988 2001 4.7 138.4 76.0 62.4 119.4 75.7 43.7 38.2 
Colombia 1988 1999 1.1 45.6 13.1 32.5 65.0 51.0 14.0 12.6 
Costa Rica 1992 2001 2.8 28.6 10.5 18.1 72.5 45.5 27.0 26.4 
Cyprus 1991 1994 1.7 173.2 18.0 155.1 211.9 190.7 21.2 20.4 
Czech Republic 1994 2001 2.4 82.6 21.0 61.7 98.4 73.7 24.7 23.6 
Denmark 1988 2001 1.7 94.2 41.2 53.0 202.2 165.4 36.7 16.8 
Dominican Republic 1997 1999 6.3 31.4 0.9 30.5 58.9 33.8 25.1 24.7 
Ecuador 1992 2001 0.1 33.7 7.3 26.4 109.0 83.2 25.8 25.4 
El Salvador 1996 2001 0.9 52.3 10.5 41.8 61.9 48.0 13.9 13.3 
Estonia 1997 2001 7.1 48.2 24.1 24.1 117.4 72.8 44.6 39.7 
Finland 1988 2001 2.0 146.0 77.1 68.9 168.7 143.8 24.9 8.2 
France 1988 2001 1.8 135.8 48.0 87.8 189.8 134.4 55.4 24.2 
Georgia 2000 2001 4.5 9.9 1.8 8.1 85.6 62.0 23.6 23.6 
Germany 1992 2001 1.4 146.4 39.1 107.3 169.3 144.6 24.7 10.0 
Ghana 1991 2001 1.7 21.7 13.9 7.8 133.1 111.3 21.8 19.6 
Greece 1988 2001 1.9 61.3 30.9 30.4 74.8 65.3 9.5 8.1 
Guatemala 1995 2001 1.5 20.6 1.0 19.6 51.7 35.8 16.0 15.9 
Honduras 1991 1998 -0.2 35.5 6.7 28.9 165.5 144.9 20.6 20.6 
Hungary 1991 2001 1.4 43.5 15.2 28.3 101.4 69.5 31.9 30.7 
Iceland 1994 2001 3.0 99.6 32.0 67.6 104.7 95.2 9.5 4.6 
Indonesia 1988 2001 3.6 60.4 18.4 42.0 94.2 86.0 8.2 7.5 
Ireland 1995 1998 8.5 133.5 55.4 78.1 594.7 527.5 67.2 51.5 
Italy 1988 2001 1.9 88.5 28.2 60.3 117.7 101.5 16.2 6.7 
Japan 1988 2001 1.8 288.9 82.9 206.0 97.4 90.9 6.6 0.6 
Jordan 1988 2001 -0.8 138.4 64.8 73.6 168.0 155.8 12.2 11.8 
Kazakhstan 1997 2001 6.1 17.5 8.1 9.4 118.3 71.1 47.2 47.2 
Kenya 1988 2001 -0.3 43.4 13.2 30.1 91.6 81.1 10.5 9.4 
Latvia 1995 2001 6.2 19.6 5.0 14.6 96.3 71.7 24.6 21.7 
Luxembourg 1988 1997 3.9 260.0 164.2 95.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Malaysia 1988 2001 4.5 322.4 170.6 151.8 132.7 80.1 52.6 41.0 
Mauritius 1990 2001 4.2 78.9 29.5 49.4 53.3 43.4 9.9 7.9 
Mexico 1988 2001 1.6 49.6 27.0 22.6 73.8 58.6 15.2 14.3 
Morocco 1990 2001 1.4 64.9 20.5 44.5 105.4 89.7 15.7 13.8 
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Netherlands 1988 1997 2.5 154.3 67.2 87.1 265.7 200.9 64.8 25.1 
New Zealand 1988 2001 1.2 133.3 41.5 91.8 152.8 92.1 60.7 47.6 
Nigeria 1988 1998 1.3 17.6 7.0 10.6 185.2 131.9 53.3 45.6 
 
Financial development Financial integration 
  
  
time span 
GDPpc 
growth Total 
finance 
Market 
capit. 
Private 
credit 
tfinint tped fdi tl 
Norway 1988 2001 2.4 105.4 28.9 76.5 124.6 98.3 26.3 10.9 
Pakistan 1988 2001 1.6 37.3 13.1 24.2 61.9 55.9 6.0 5.4 
Paraguay 1993 2001 -0.1 32.9 3.1 29.8 69.3 53.4 15.9 14.4 
Peru 1990 2001 1.3 36.2 17.3 19.0 93.2 76.2 17.0 16.3 
Philippines 1988 2001 1.2 86.4 49.0 37.3 105.1 91.2 13.9 12.7 
Poland 1991 2001 3.6 29.9 7.7 22.2 65.0 55.2 9.8 9.3 
Portugal 1988 1998 3.4 81.8 20.0 61.8 107.4 90.2 17.2 14.3 
Romania 1996 2001 0.4 11.7 2.5 9.2 56.6 44.3 12.3 12.0 
Slovak Republic 1994 2001 4.1 53.1 6.8 46.2 94.0 79.1 14.9 13.6 
Slovenia 1994 2001 4.0 38.9 8.3 30.6 68.8 54.2 14.6 11.6 
South Africa 1988 2001 0.0 251.2 140.1 111.0 75.6 45.3 30.3 14.3 
Spain 1988 2001 2.9 123.9 42.6 81.3 113.4 85.6 27.8 17.8 
Sri Lanka 1988 2001 3.4 35.2 13.4 21.8 87.6 78.0 9.6 9.5 
Sweden 1988 2001 1.5 180.7 79.1 101.6 233.9 154.0 79.9 26.3 
Switzerland 1988 2001 0.9 317.6 155.9 161.7 547.3 471.9 75.4 24.4 
Thailand 1988 2001 4.9 160.2 46.5 113.7 88.3 71.4 16.9 15.3 
Trinidad and Tobago 1991 2001 2.7 76.5 35.0 41.5 149.3 60.5 88.8 87.3 
Turkey 1988 2001 1.0 41.0 20.0 21.0 63.7 59.3 4.3 3.9 
Uganda 2001 2001 1.7 6.5 0.6 5.9 103.4 83.0 20.4 17.2 
Ukraine 1997 2001 2.9 13.0 4.4 8.6 75.7 66.2 9.4 9.3 
United Kingdom 1988 2001 2.2 246.2 129.3 117.0 439.6 383.4 56.2 23.4 
United States 1988 2001 1.9 243.5 102.1 141.4 115.4 79.6 35.7 16.5 
Uruguay 1993 2000 1.8 35.8 1.1 34.7 112.8 102.0 10.8 10.5 
Zambia 1995 2001 -0.1 16.2 8.2 8.1 267.0 207.1 59.8 59.9 
Zimbabwe 1988 2001 -0.1 55.6 28.1 27.5 64.6 56.2 8.4 6.5 
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